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Abstract
We propose a framework to examine convergence in the jurisdictional patterns
of the American FTC and the European Commission. Based on a sample of 595
merger cases scrutinized by either of these agencies in the 1995 - 2007 period,
we estimate logit models of the probability of intervening in a merger for both
jurisdictions and use them to predict the decisions of the respectively other
agency. The results point to an increasing harmonization of merger regimes and
corroborate the theoretical appraisal, that the 2004 reform of EU merger law
constituted a step towards the US system.
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1. Introduction
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Directorate General for Com-
petition (DG Competition) are among the most important regulatory authorities
in merger control worldwide. Their verdicts on merger cases can shape global
markets to a substantial degree and the scope of their jurisdictional competence
extends far beyond national (or communal) borders. And yet these two insti-
tutions differ greatly in history, method and aim: whereas US merger control -
and antitrust in general - looks back on a long history, for the longest part of
which it was shaped and developed in the spirit of a pro-competitive doctrine
with the goal of ensuring dynamic and efficient market structures,2 the common
European competition authority is a relatively young institution whose goals,
like those of its predecessors, are more pluralistic in nature. While ensuring
competitive markets features prominently among DG Competition’s objectives,
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issues of market integration, a distinct distrust for concentrated markets and
market foreclosure as well as political motives also play a role.3
This article attempts to evaluate empirically if and to what degree con-
vergence of US and European merger policies took place between 1995 and
2007. This time period is a particularly interesting subject for an investiga-
tion of this kind, because it includes data prior to and after the 2004 reform of
European merger law (ECMR04),4 which led to an increased use of economic
analysis in merger review (the ’more economic approach’) and was interpreted
as a step towards US policy (for example Verouden et al. (2004); Coppi and
Walker (2004); Bergman et al. (2010b)). The principal research question of this
article is whether this perception can be quantitatively substantiated. We ad-
dress this question by checking for a structural break in the coefficients of the
EU model after the coming-into-force of ECMR04 and comparing the results of
all measures of convergence before and after May 2004.
While the subject of convergence of merger policies has been discussed in
great detail from a theoretical point of view by legal and economic scholars as
well as practitioners, empirical evidence on the issue is mostly limited to ’ca-
sual empiricism’ and anecdotal evidence.5 The goal of this article is thus to
quantitatively reassess the theoretical findings on the convergence of transat-
lantic merger policies by empirical analysis. To do this, a database containing
595 merger cases scrutinized by the FTC or DG Competition (or, in rare cases,
both) during the period from January 1995 to December 2007 has been assem-
bled to investigate whether their jurisdictions have become increasingly similar.
Both the EU Commission and the FTC pursue a consumer welfare standard;
thus instead of total welfare the benefit of consumers is the focus of antitrust
activity. According to standard oligopoly models, consumers benefit from merg-
ers that increase the degree of competition that prevails in the industry (i.e.
procompetitive mergers), while mergers with the opposite effect (anticompeti-
tive mergers) increase producer surplus to the detriment of consumer welfare.
Assuming that the competitive impact of a merger on markets can - at least
partially - be captured by circumstantial information on the transaction, one
would expect two agencies that maximize the same target function to exhibit
similar jurisdictional patterns. Thus, while the impact of competition policy on
welfare remains unobserved and controversial, the requirement that the Com-
mission and the FTC should reach the same conclusion when investigating the
same merger can be regarded as a consistency check of their efforts.
3Coppi and Walker (2004) and Shenefield (2004) discuss the different aims of US and com-
mon European competition law, Schwartz (1993) sketches the development of national Euro-
pean merger policies up to the common European Community Merger Regulation (ECMR) of
1989, Cini and McGowan (1998) continue from there. The 2004 reform of European merger
policy is reviewed and evaluated in Lyons (2004) and Duso et al. (2010). Bergman et al. (2005)
and Duso et al. (2007) provide empirical studies on the determinants of an intervention by
DG Competition.
4Commission No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between
undertakings.
5For a recent contribution in a quantitative vein, see Bergman et al. (2010a).
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Additionally, consistent jurisdiction based on transparent, economically--
motivated analysis reduces the uncertainty firms face when notifying transac-
tions. This is of course also true when a merger is only notified to a single
competition authority, but becomes increasingly important when multiple au-
thorities are competent for the transaction. Large mergers are routinely re-
viewed by both US and EU authorities, increasing the risk of partially approved
mergers, i.e. mergers that are cleared by one jurisdiction but not by the other;
an outcome that is undesirable from both a business and a political perspective.
Finally and related to the previous point, there are also political rationales
and credibility issues to consider: as much as diametrically opposed verdicts
on the same subject matter undermine the credibility of the agencies, as much
political calamities are they prone to entail.6
Merger policy in the US is exercised by the FTC and its sister agency, the
Department of Justice (DoJ). The division of merger cases between the two
agencies is effected on an (informal) industry basis. Since detailed data on DoJ
cases are not publicly available, they cannot be used in the analysis undertaken
in this article, which requires in-depth case information. Therefore, this article’s
conclusions, strictly speaking, only apply to US merger policy as practiced by
the FTC. However, the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines,7 which constitute
the basis of the merger assessment by both agencies and offer detailed standard
procedures, have been developed and published jointly by the FTC and the DoJ
since 1992. Therefore, issues of merger policy convergence within the US are
of much lesser concern than tendencies of convergence with different juridical
systems. It might thus be argued that the US cases contained in the sample
employed here can - at least when contrasted with a system of competition
policy, the dissimilarity of which arguably dwarves intra-US discrepancies - be
regarded as representative of US merger control.8
The findings of this empirical investigation are very much in line with those
of the theoretical literature: While there can be no talk of perfect convergence,
the progress made in terms of harmonization is substantial. All measures of
jurisdictional differences diminish over the sample period. In particular, the
2004 reform of European merger law seems to have been a substantial step
6A prime example for this and the point relating to partially approved mergers is the
attempted GE/Honeywell merger in 2001, which was cleared by US authorities but blocked
by the European Commission, resulting in the discontinuation of the merger by the parties
and a major political quarrel. Patterson and Shapiro (2001) discuss the case and ask: ’In
an era of close cooperation and supposed convergence, how did the North American and Eu-
ropean antitrust authorities reach diametrically opposed conclusions about the likelihood of
anticompetitive effects in a high-profile transaction involving world-wide markets?’ An expla-
nation they offer is that ’the divergence exposed in GE/Honeywell is rooted in fundamental
substantive and economic differences in doctrine between the United States and EU merger
regimes.’
7Department of Justice & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992, rev. 1997) and De-
partment of Justice & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010). See Shapiro (2010) for a
discussion of the evolution of the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
8Potential biases due to the lack of DoJ data in the sample are addressed econometrically
in 5.3 and 5.4.3.
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towards US merger policy: when comparing convergence results measured prior
to and after ECMR04, we find significant differences in favor of convergence in
the post-reform period.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes
the history of policy convergence, reviews the relevant literature and highlights
institutional differences between the FTC and the EU Commission, section 3
presents the data, section 4 the methodology employed. Results are presented
in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. Historical overview and literature
The general notion of policy convergence in competition policy has been a
subject of discussion for quite a while now. Scherer (1994, 1997) discusses the
general tendency of worldwide competition policy to approach pro-competitive
doctrines over the course of the twentieth century. The idea that competition
policy should ensure competitive markets seems self-evident from today’s point
of view, but at the beginning of the twentieth century only the US was actively
prosecuting monopolies and cartels (for example Kovacic and Shapiro (2000)).
In Europe and large parts of the rest of the world cartels were thought to
dampen the impact of business cycles (for example Audretsch (1989)), while
monopolies were deemed necessary to operate on efficient production scales and
compete internationally. The change towards a pro-competitive doctrine came
about after WW2, in the second half of the last century. In this sense, there
has undeniably been a lot of progress in the harmonization of competition law.
In this article, however, we take for granted that competition authorities in
general (political or other motives aside) pursue the goal of ensuring competitive
markets and instead focus on the convergence of their jurisdictional patterns,
that is, their decision to intervene in certain mergers and to clear others.
More recent tendencies concerning the convergence and potential conflicts in
international competition law are considered in Calvani (2004). Calvani exam-
ines the evolution of cooperation among competition authorities in the period
from 1990 to 2004, gives examples for areas of convergence and remaining dis-
crepancies and concludes in favor of harmonization. While Niels and Ten Kate
(2004) focus on normative differences between the US and the EU approach to
competition law (economic vs. legalistic approach, treatment of dominant firms
etc.), Coppi and Walker (2004) discuss technical differences in the evaluation of
mergers (market definitions, econometric techniques, concentration measures,
dominance vs. market power; the perceived ’unilateral effects gap’ of pre-2004
European competition law is discussed in particular depth). Shenefield (2004)
argues in a similar vein, highlighting the role of different objectives in US an EU
antitrust. All of them concede that while some differences remain, tendencies
of ’soft’ convergence are undeniable.
Cooper et al. (2005) detect differing views on vertical policy on both sides
of the Atlantic: While DG Competition takes vertical agreements very seri-
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ously, US agencies have a more lenient regard of them.9 In contrast, opinions
on horizontal combinations (as expressed in the respective ’horizontal merger
guidelines’: FTC (2010), DG Competition (2004)) seem to be rather similar in
both competition authorities (for example Verouden et al. (2004)). Horlick and
Meyer (1995) argue that competition policy convergence is especially notice-
able in merger control, because it is in the interest of all countries concerned.
In other areas of competition policy, for example the regulation of subsidies
and tariffs, international consent might be harder to achieve due to conflicting
national interests.
The topic of policy convergence is also discussed in the political science lit-
erature. Even though this literature focuses mainly on tendencies of global
convergence of environmental and labor policies (for example Busch and Joer-
gens (2005)), the driving forces for convergence identified can be assessed with a
regard to competition policy. The most frequently cited drivers for policy con-
vergence (for example Drezner (2001)) are: i) a race-to-bottom (that is, complete
deregulation) mechanism fuelled by economic pressure, ii) various forms of in-
stitutionalism and iii) an epistemic communities approach.10 While mechanism
i) (a ’race of deregulation’ among nations) seems implausible in competition
policy, ii) arguably does play a role in the harmonization of global antitrust: in-
stitutions like the International Competition Network (ICN) or the World Trade
Organization (WTO) certainly have their part in levelling competition policies
around the globe. Van Waarden and Drahos (2002) propose, that the epistemic
communities approach is most suited for explaining the convergence of compe-
tition policies. This approach postulates that the emergence of a community
of legally trained officials - with similar epistemic beliefs - provides a channel
for the international diffusion of ideas, methods and practices, which - in turn -
cause convergence. See Haas (1992) for an introduction to the topic.
2.1. Institutional details
An investigation in transatlantic merger policy convergence warrants a brief
discussion of institutional details and differences on both sides of the Atlantic.
A more thorough comparison can be found in the more law-focused articles cited
in the literature review above.
Both the EU and the US use a system of mandatory merger notification, such
that mergers exceeding certain financial thresholds have to be notified before
they can be consummated. This threshold is higher in the EU, such that smaller
mergers can be delegated to individual member states for investigation.11 Once
9To control for this possible area of divergence, the analysis is repeated in a subsample
excluding non-horizontal mergers as a robustness check. See section 5.4.1.
10The epistemic communities approach is related to the elite consensus and the world society
approaches, which are not discussed separately in this brief overview. Holzinger and Knill
(2005) review the causes of policy convergence in the political science literature in greater
detail.
11Details on the Commission’s notification threshold can be found in the EC Merger Regu-
lation available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/legislation.html, the
5
notified, an initial stage of merger review commences: in the US, the merging
parties have to comply with a 30 day waiting period (15 days in the case of a
cash tender offer) before consummating the transaction, in the EU the phase I
investigation lasts up to 25 working days. Most mergers are cleared to proceed
at the end of this period.
If at the end of the initial review period the agency has doubts with respect
to the competitive impact of the merger, it can initiate a second stage of inves-
tigation, called a ’second request’ in the US and phase II in the EU, providing
them with a more generous time frame to conduct a full investigation on the
likely effects of the transaction. After the second stage expires, the agency can
decide to either unconditionally clear, conditionally clear or block a merger. In
the first case the transaction proposed by the merging parties is allowed to pro-
ceed without modification. In the second case, the merger is permitted subject
to conditions and obligations. This usually involves the divestiture of certain
assets or branches (structural remedies) or requirements concerning the future
conduct vis à vis competitors (behavioral remedies). If the agency prohibits a
merger, the transaction has to be cancelled.
While remedies have to be negotiated with the merging firms by both agen-
cies, the EU Commission can unilaterally decide to block a merger (although
this decision can be appealed at the Court of First Instance). The FTC, on the
other hand, only authorizes its staff to file a preliminary injunction against the
merger, which has to be defended in court. Another notable difference is that
the Commission commonly accepts remedies proposed by the merging parties
during the phase I investigation while the FTC usually either clears or issues
a second request. Still, the differences on an institutional level appear to be
limited.
Before May 2004 there were, however, substantial differences in the merger
guidelines of the two agencies. Most prominently, in the initial assessment of
the market power effects of a combination the FTC tests if a merger will ’sub-
stantially lessen competition’, while the EU tested whether a merger ’creates
or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition
would be significantly impeded’, which obstructed the prosecution of coordi-
nated effects cases. After ECMR04 the relevant question has become whether a
merger will ’significantly impede effective competition’, which allows to prose-
cute a wider range of cases and is semantically closer to the US criterion. Other
changes effected by ECMR04 include the introduction of an efficiency defense
clause (which was effectively introduced to US merger guidelines in April 1997),
the appointment of a Chief Economist at the head of a team of economists and
the issuance of explicit merger guidelines to encourage transparency and consis-
tency in decision making. As was pointed out by several commentators, all of
these changes point towards greater coherence with American merger control.
FTC’s current threshold can be looked up at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/index.shtm.
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3. Data
The data used in this analysis were created by combining two datasets on
mergers, one containing EU cases, one containing US cases. The EU dataset
comprises merger cases handled by DG Competition in the time period from
1991 to 2007. The US dataset contains mergers which were assessed by the FTC
between 1995 and 2008. The resulting dataset contains 595 observations, 309
EU and 286 US mergers. Since our analysis aims to achieve a direct comparison
of the two agencies, most graphs are restricted to the overlap period 1995-2007,
containing observations for both agencies (269 EU and 274 US observations).
The logit models and time trend regressions employ all available data.
Information on EU cases was collected from the decisions available on DG
Competition’s homepage,12 for the US cases we accessed the news releases and
memoranda available on the FTC homepage.13 Going through these documents,
we recorded the names of the merging parties, the outcome of the investigation as
well as variables summarizing the results of the market investigation conducted.
The Hoover’s14 database was used to determine the primary competitors
in each merger case. The companies (merging parties and their competitors
from US and EU cases) were then linked to the Thomson Reuters Worldscope
database,15 from which additional firm-level data was downloaded. The vari-
ables in the dataset are summarized in table 1.
The first variable in table 1 (action) is a dummy that indicates whether a
merger was subjected to conditions and obligations or prohibited (action = 1)
or cleared unconditionally (action = 0).16 This is the dependent variable of the
logit models presented in section 5.1.
The next three variables (’local markets’, ’US- or EU-wide markets’, ’world-
wide markets’) report the extent of the geographic market concerned by the
merger. Markets are local (or regional), if only a part of the US or a single
EU member state is affected by the merger. If multiple (or all) regions (or
member states) are affected, the merger was classified as community-wide. If
the relevant market exceeded the US or the EU, it was classified as worldwide.
In cases where multiple markets are concerned, the largest market definition
was recorded.17 Cases for which no market definition could be identified were
dropped from the sample.
12http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/.
13http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/index.shtm.
14http://www.hoovers.com/.
15http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/financial/financial_products/products_-
az/worldscope_fundamentals.
16Less than 5% of the cases in the sample were either prohibited by DG Competition or
abandoned after the FTC succeeded in obtaining an injunction in court. Since the focus of this
article lies on the decision to intervene in a merger and not on the choice or adequateness of
the measure of intervention, these cases are not distinguished from other remedies. In section
5.4.2 we run a robustness check excluding these cases.
17In some cases - in particular those, where a formal decision was unavailable - the relevant
market was recorded from the filing of the transaction to the SEC.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Variables
Variable EU US Description
mean mean
Action 0.50 0.68 1 if the merger was reme-
died or blocked, 0 if it was
cleared
Local markets 0.41 0.27 Relevant market is local
US-(EU-)wide markets 0.38 0.52 Revevant market is EU- or
US-wide
Worldwide markets 0.21 0.20 Relevant market is world-
wide
HHI before merger 0.51 0.36 HHI using pre-merger
market shares
Barriers to entry 0.44 0.61 1 if barriers to entry were
found during investigation
Dominant firm 0.54 0.66 1 if one of the firms in the
market has a market share
> 50%
Horizontal mergers 0.65 0.71 1 if merger between hori-
zontal competitors
Cross-border merger 0.68 0.42 1 if the merging firms are
from different nations
US dummy 0.29 0.67 1 if at least one merging
party is from the US
EU dummy 0.63 0.24 1 if at least one merging
party is from the EU
Intra-US 0.10 0.56 1 if both merging parties
are from the US
Intra-EU 0.54 0.08 1 if both merging parties
are from the EU
R&D merging 11.83 11.94 Sum of R&D spending
merging firms
R&D rivals 14.04 14.90 Sum of R&D spending ri-
vals
Market value merging 14.57 16.94 Sum of market value
merging firms
Market value rivals 16.65 19.03 Sum of market value rivals
Dividends merging 34.97 24.52 Sum of profit payout ra-
tios merging firms
Dividends rivals 103.81 125.24 Sum of profit payout ra-
tios rivals
Observations 309 286
R&D expenditures and market values are reported as logs of 1,000 USD.
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’HHI before merger’ reports the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index in the rele-
vant market, prior to the transaction in question. Where available, this was
recorded from the decisions. If the HHI was not reported in the decision, we
calculated an approximation using the reported sales of the merging parties
and their rivals. ’Barriers to entry’ is a dummy indicating whether the market
investigation revealed significant barriers for firms trying to enter the relevant
market. These barriers can be due to high capital requirements, long product
development times, existing trade agreements or similar reasons. The ’dominant
firm’ dummy is equal to one, if the market investigation revealed that one of
the firms in the market (either a merging firm or a rival) has a market share in
excess of 50% before the merger.18
The remainder of the dataset is constructed from firm-level data: a combi-
nation is classified as a ’horizontal merger’ if the acquirer and the target share
the same SIC2 industry code. ’Cross-border merger’ equals one for transactions
between firms that are not headquartered in the same country. The US and
EU dummies equal one, if at least one of the merging firms is headquartered in
the US or EU. The ’Intra-US’ and ’Intra-EU’ variables indicate if both merg-
ing parties originate from the respective region. ’R&D merging’ (’R&D rivals’)
reports the sum of R&D expenditures by the merging firms (rivals) as logs of
1,000 USD. The ’market value’ variables report market values in an analogous
fashion. Finally, ’dividends merging’ (’dividends rivals’) is the sum of the per-
centages of profit that are paid to shareholders in the form of dividends by the
merging firms (rivals).
The variable means of US and EU cases reported in table 1 exhibit some
differences with respect to both merger-specific as well as firm-specific variables.
US and EU cases therefore are, to a degree, structurally different. This issue
is explicitly addressed by our methodology: the results on convergence (sec-
tion 5.2) are corroborated in section 5.3, where the analysis is restricted to
propensity-score matched subsamples to control for the possibility of a sample
selection bias. As a robustness check, we also report the results of an Oaxaca
decomposition into regime- and case-specific differences in section 5.4.4.
18In some cases - less than 15% of the sample - the existence of barriers or a dominant
firm had to be estimated from the data, because the market investigation was not publicly
available. The predicted values for these dummies - obtained from logit models using a
comprehensive set of SIC2 dummies and most other explanatory variables from the dataset
- correlate highly with those collected from the decisions (ρ = 0.78 for barriers, ρ = 0.70
for dominant firms); additionally, we only retained clear-cut predictions where P (barriers)
and P (dominant firm) are either < 0.3 or > 0.7. While this may add some noise to our
data, the following robustness check suggests a small effect: in accord with economic theory,
both entry barriers and dominant firms are strongly and significantly correlated with industry
profitability (ρ = 0.22 for barriers, ρ = 0.16 for dominant firms). This correlation is not
reduced by the addition of the predicted values.
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4. Methodology
This section outlines this article’s approach to policy convergence and how it
is measured and presents some details concerning the propensity score matching
procedure we use to obtain a homogenous subsample.
4.1. Measuring convergence
The keystone of this inquiry in policy convergence are logit models, which
emulate the decisions to either intervene or clear a merger case by the FTC and
DG Competition. The dependent variable, action (equal to zero if the case was
cleared, equal to one if it was either remedied or blocked), is regressed on the
following covariates: dummies indicating the size of the relevant market, high
pre-merger market concentration, barriers to entry, horizontal and crossborder
mergers, the involvement of US or EU firms, intra-US and intra-EU mergers as
well as a dummy for the Bush administration are complemented with continuous
variables containing the pre-merger HHI, as well as R&D spending, market
values and dividend payouts of merging parties and their rivals prior to the
merger. Controls for industry effects, EU Commissioners and FTC chairmen
are included, but not reported. To calibrate these models, the whole sample of
merger cases, for which sufficient data is available, is used (309 observations for
the EU model, 286 for the US model). The models are presented in section 5.1.
Since the subsample of cases which were actually scrutinized by both the
FTC and DG Competition (the ’overlap’ of jurisdictions) is too small for statis-
tical analysis, the following workaround will be applied: Using the logit models
calibrated to the jurisdictions of the FTC and DG Competition, we predict the
likelihood of an intervention for all cases from the point of view of both agencies.
The absolute difference of predictions in merger k is defined as
σk =
∣∣∣PˆUS(actionk)− PˆEU (actionk)∣∣∣ , (1)
where Pˆm(actionk) (m = US,EU) is the probability of an intervention es-
timated by the model of agency m in merger k. k = 1, . . . , N runs through the
whole sample of (US and EU) mergers. σ-convergence occurs if the limit of σk
over a sequence of chronologically ordered mergers approaches zero, but in a
finite sample we will conclude in favor of σ-convergence if the average σk de-
creases over time. An increase, on the other hand, would suggest jurisdictional
divergence.
4.2. Propensity score matching
As can be seen from table 1, the observations in the US and EU subsamples
are to a certain degree different with regard to the characteristics we observe:
while market values and R&D spending are higher for US merging firms and
rivals in the sample, EU merging firms pay higher dividends. The Commission
is more likely to find the relevant geographic market to be local (i.e. restricted
to one member state), while the FTC finds US-wide markets in fifty percent of
the cases. Industry dummies differ across the subsamples as well. This observed
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heterogeneity could be either due to differences in the kind of mergers that are
being investigated in the US and Europe, or due to the limitation of our sample
to FTC cases for a lack of DoJ data. We address this issue explicitly via the
use of propensity score matching. Since the number of yearly observations is
too small to create an adequate pool for matching prior to 1999, the matched
sample is restricted to the time period from 1999 to 2007.
Propensity score matching (PSM) was developed by Rosenbaum (1983) and
is used to reduce the bias due to sample selection.19 The concept is frequently
applied to the experimental design in the medical sciences: when trying to single
out the causal effect of a treatment, the subjects of the control group should
be as similar as possible to those of the treated group. The PSM algorithm
provides a measure of similarity based on a set of covariates. In the context of
our analysis, being ’treated’ means being handled by one competition authority
(the problem is symmetric). The PSM algorithm is used to find subsamples
of US and EU cases, such that the heterogeneity with respect to the specified
covariates is minimized.20
The covariates used to calculate the propensity score are the challenge rate
(’action’), the dummies for geographic market definitions and entry barriers, the
HHI index, the dummies for the involvement of EU- and US-firms, a dummy for
cross-border transactions as well as the data on market values, R&D spending
and dividends of merging firms and their rivals. We use a version of the PSM
algorithm developed for Stata by Leuven and Sianesi (2003), modified to find
unique best matches within the same year and removing them from the pool
after matching. Thus, the algorithm calculates the matrix of propensity scores
between all EU and US cases in a given year, finds the best match (the small-
est difference in propensity scores) and removes the two cases thus matched
from the pool. Then the second best match is selected and so on. Calibrating
the algorithm such that after the matching procedure the average difference
in propensity scores of the yearly matches (the average structural difference of
cases in the subsample, based on the above covariates) remains below 10% de-
termines the amount of matches per year at 11. This yields 22 merger cases per
year from 1999 - 2007, producing a subsample of 198 cases in total.
All of the results presented in section 5.2 will be iterated in this subsample.
While the whole sample contains the maximum amount of cases available to us
and thus allows the most surveying picture of the two jurisdictional systems,
the matched subsample is designed to eliminate effects that arise either due to
differences in the types of cases the two authorities handle or due to sample
selection.
19For an application to mergers see Weichselbaumer (2008).
20Notice that in this setting there is not one ’treated’ and one ’control’ group, but actually
two treated groups. We thus divert the algorithm from its originally intended use (singling out
a causal effect between treatment and control groups) and employ it to increase the similarity
of two subsamples.
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5. Results
5.1. Logit Models
To simulate the patterns of jurisdiction of the two competition authorities,
we calibrate logit models using the subsamples of US cases (286 observations)
and EU cases (309 observations). The dependent variable in these models is
action, the decision to either clear a merger or intervene.
5.1.1. Do the model coefficients change?
Pooling all observations into a single model for each jurisdiction means im-
plicitly assuming that both jurisdictions can be regarded as static constructs
over the whole sample period. While continuity and predictability are desirable
traits in a merger control authority, this is a strong assumption which has to be
justified. We address this issue by first identifying points in time at which struc-
tural breaks in competition policy could plausibly occur, then estimating the
jurisdictional models in the non-overlapping partitions thus defined and using a
generalized Hausman specification test (based on the joint variance/covariance
matrix of the models) to compare the coefficients of these models. The null
hypothesis of the Hausman test is, that there is no significant difference in the
model coefficients. If this is rejected, separate models will have to be estimated
for the periods in question.
In the US sample, the most plausible points to test for structural breaks
are potential regime changes due to changes in the political environment. In
particular, our sample includes mergers scrutinized during the Clinton (1993 -
2001) and Bush (2001 - 2009) administrations, allowing us to check for different
merger policy regimes during periods of democratic and republican presidency.
We estimate two logit models, restricted to the respective terms of office
(columns 1 and 2 in figure 2), and compare their coefficients using a Hausman
test. Most of the coefficients are similar in size and equal in sign across the
models and the Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis of equal model
coefficients during the Clinton and Bush administrations (p = 0.18).21
This continuity in US merger control in our sample may well be due to the
fact that almost the whole sample falls between the 1997 revision of merger
guidelines and the publication of the 2010 merger guidelines. Thus, while US
merger policy certainly was not perfectly static, there are no obvious discontinu-
ities in our data on US merger control, allowing us to pool all US observations.22
The estimation results for the three different US models are reported in 5.1.2.
The most obvious potential regime change in our data on European merger
control is due to the major changes in European merger legislation brought
about by the ECMR04. Therefore, two models of EU jurisdiction, one prior to
and one after the reform in May 2004, are estimated; again, a Hausman test
21Coate and Ulrick (2006) report a similar finding, concluding that ’[. . . ] merger enforce-
ment policy [in the US] has remained relatively stable during the 1996 to 2003 time period’.
22Similarly, Leary (2002) concludes in favor of essential stability of US merger policy in the
1980ies and 90ies.
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is employed to compare the model coefficients. The Hausman test very signifi-
cantly (p = 0.001) rejects the null hypothesis of equal coefficients between the
two models. Thus, the perceived major impact of the 2004 reform on European
merger law (for example Drauz and Reynolds (2003)) is reflected in the data and
will have to be made allowance for by using separate models of EU jurisdiction
for the periods prior to and after it. The two EU models are reported in 5.1.2
as well.
5.1.2. Estimation
Three logit models are calibrated using the subsamples of US cases, EU cases
prior to ECMR04 and EU cases post-ECMR04.23 Table 2 contains the results.
The most important drivers for the FTC’s decision to intervene (column 3)
in a merger are the degree of market concentration as measured by the HHI
index and the existence of barriers to entry. While higher industry profits - as
proxied by rivals’ dividends - increase the probability of an intervention, markets
with high R&D expenditures receive less regulatory scrutiny. A challenge is less
likely if the relevant market is found to be worldwide. Mergers involving US
firms have a better chance of being cleared unconditionally, particularly so if
both merging firms are US-based. The same applies for horizontal mergers and
cross-border mergers. Finally, the Bush administration significantly facilitated
M&A activity.
Prior to the 2004 reform of European merger law (column 4), the main
drivers for an intervention by DG Competition were barriers to entry, the exis-
tence of a dominant player in the market as well as the market values of both
merging parties (proxying for the importance of the transaction) and rivals
(proxying for market size). Political factors seem to have played an important
role as well: firms originating from the EU or from the US were treated prefer-
ably in comparison to firms from other parts of the world. Finally, while DG
Comp seems to have prosecuted horizontal transaction with particular rigor,
cross-border mergers were treated significantly more lenient.
Post-reform (column 5), the significant covariates for an intervention of DG
Competition change substantially: among the significant results, only those re-
garding barriers to entry and dominant firms remain. Instead, the Commission
seems to place increased weight on geographic market definitions (worldwide
markets strongly reduce the likelihood of an intervention) and market concen-
tration (the pre-merger HHI now significantly affects the decision to intervene).
The R&D expenditures of both merging firms and rivals decrease, while indus-
try dividends increase the probability of a challenge, indicating that dynamic
markets pose a lesser concern than mature markets, in which profits are paid
out instead of reinvested. These findings are in line with the ’more economic
approach’ the ECMR04 was supposed to achieve.
23The US models restricted to the terms of office of the Clinton and Bush administrations
are reported as well, but are - since they do not significantly differ and are not used for the
purposes of prediction - not discussed.
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Table 2: Marginal Effects on the Probability of Intervention
Clinton Bush US model EU model EU model
1995-2001 2001-2008 pooled pre-reform post-reform
Local markets 0.013 0.158 0.059 0.053 0.003
(0.065) (0.106) (0.061) (0.055) (0.075)
Worldwide markets −0.040 −0.169∗∗ −0.109∗∗ 0.054 −0.300∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.079) (0.050) (0.059) (0.107)
HHI before merger 0.658∗∗ 0.528∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗ 0.123 0.300∗∗
(0.263) (0.245) (0.151) (0.091) (0.152)
Barriers to entry 0.020 0.341∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.055) (0.039) (0.033) (0.057)
Dominant firm 0.021 0.054 0.042 0.239∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.081) (0.049) (0.039) (0.063)
Cross-border merger −0.122 −0.119 −0.163∗∗ −0.099∗ 0.074
(0.086) (0.127) (0.076) (0.052) (0.077)
Horizontal mergers 0.017 −0.108 −0.081∗ 0.089∗ −0.087
(0.051) (0.074) (0.048) (0.047) (0.070)
US dummy −0.142 −0.204∗ −0.128∗ −0.152∗ −0.214
(0.088) (0.105) (0.066) (0.079) (0.147)
EU dummy 0.010 −0.062 −0.017 −0.154∗∗ 0.068
(0.088) (0.119) (0.072) (0.066) (0.091)
Intra-US −0.007 −0.257∗ −0.173∗ −0.023 0.176
(0.106) (0.139) (0.089) (0.102) (0.183)
Intra-EU −0.112 −0.142 −0.111 −0.027 −0.092
(0.105) (0.138) (0.093) (0.072) (0.108)
R&D merging −0.002 −0.026 −0.027∗ 0.000 −0.033∗∗
(0.015) (0.022) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016)
R&D rivals −0.019 0.001 −0.027 −0.011 −0.031∗
(0.020) (0.029) (0.018) (0.013) (0.016)
Market value merging −0.018 −0.007 −0.008 0.016∗∗ 0.011
(0.016) (0.031) (0.017) (0.006) (0.016)
Market value rivals −0.000 0.006 0.018 0.012∗∗ 0.025
(0.020) (0.038) (0.022) (0.006) (0.018)
Dividends merging 0.001 −0.001 0.001 0.001∗ −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dividends rivals 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Bush administration −0.195∗∗∗
(0.043)
Observations 140 146 286 211 98
Pseudo R2 0.58 0.45 0.49 0.64 0.68
Correctly Classified 93% 81% 86% 91% 94%
Standard errors in parentheses, the symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels respectively. Regression includes controls for the political environment
(EU Commissioners and FTC chairmen) and industry effects. A case counts as ’correctly
classified’ if either (Pˆm(action) > 0.5 and action = 1) or (Pˆm(action) < 0.5 and action = 0).
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The variables indicating local geographic markets as well as the dummy for
intra-EU combinations remain insignificant in all three models.24 The goodness
of fit measures are very good in all models: R2s of 49% in the US model and
64% and 68% in the EU models permit the correct classification of 86%, 91%
and 94% of observations respectively.25
When comparing the pre-reform EU model with the US model there doesn’t
seem to be much common ground in the decision process: the only common
significant factors are barriers to entry, US firms and cross-border mergers.
Some relevant variables such as market definition and pre-merger concentration
remain insignificant in the EU model, while the dummy for horizontal mergers is
significant in both models, but with opposing signs. Post-reform, however, the
significant covariates for a challenge seem to be more aligned in both models,
with the main drivers for an intervention being market definitions, pre-merger
market concentration, entry barriers, R&D expenditures and dividends. Thus
from the change in coefficients it would seem, that post-ECMR04 EU jurisdiction
has become more similar to that of the FTC.
To test this intuition, we compare the model coefficients using a generalized
Hausman with the null hypothesis of not significantly different coefficients in
both models (see section 5.1.1). Unsurprisingly, when comparing the pre-reform
EU model with the US model the null hypothesis is rejected at p = 0.002. When
comparing the US model to the post-reform EU model, we find that the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected (p = 0.21). Thus, the two models do not signif-
icantly differ with respect to their coefficients. This finding is a considerable
piece of evidence in support of the hypothesis that US and EU jurisdictions on
merger cases have substantially converged with respect to the factors determin-
ing an intervention.
5.2. Convergence of predictions
In this section we use the logit models estimated in 5.1 to predict probabil-
ities of intervention and apply the measure of convergence discussed in 4.1 to
the predictions.
Figure 1 reports the yearly mean of the absolute differences in the predictions
by the EU and US models as well as a polynomial fit with 95% confidence interval
to the individual data points (i.e. mergers, not yearly means) for all mergers in
the sample after 1992 (574 observations).26
24Additional dummies for large and small EU member states and other political effects were
found to be insignificant and collinear with other regressors and were excluded from the final
specification.
25A case counts as ’correctly classified’ if the predicted probability of an intervention,
Pˆm(action), is > 0.5 and an intervention ocurred, or if the proability is < 0.5 and the case
was cleared.
26The fact that this measure effectively pools US and EU mergers, allows us to extend
the observation period to 1993 - 2008. The means for 1993, 1994 and 2008 are based on
significantly fewer observations than those of the other years, which is reflected in the larger
confidence interval.
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Figure 1: Average difference in predictions of EU and US model
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The mean absolute difference in predictions for all mergers between 1993
and 2008 is almost 27%. This is significantly higher at be start of the sample
period: in the first four years, 1993 - 1996, the mean absolute difference amounts
to almost 39%. The initial difference rapidly decreases and averages around 27%
in the next four years. After rising to an average of 31% in the 2001 - 2003 period,
we observe a reduction in the average, absolute predictive difference, reaching
its minimum at the end of the sample period. The average difference in the
post-reform period is only 23%. Regressing the prediction errors on the year in
which the merger ocurred (see table 3) confirms the existence of a negative time
trend. Additionally, a t-test shows that prediction errors are on average 7.3%
lower in the post-reform period.
While the initial high differences might be attributed to a relatively small
sample (68 observations from 1993 - 1996) and the inexperience of a newly-
founded institution (DG Competition commenced its activity in 1990), the sec-
ond peak of incongruity in 2001/2002 coincides with the reversal of three EU
decisions to block mergers by the Court of First Instance, marking a prob-
lematic period in European merger control. After 2002, the models’ predictions
become increasingly similar, reducing the average predictive difference by about
a third until the end of the observation period and indicating some degree of
convergence in the agencies’ jurisdictional patterns.
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Table 3: Difference in model predictions: Time trend and t-tests
Full sample Matched sample
Year -0.008∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗
(0.003) (0.007)
Observations 595 198
Pre-reform mean 0.301 0.293
Post-reform mean 0.228 0.228
Difference 0.073∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
5.3. Convergence in matched subsample
To rule out that the findings of the previous section are driven by sample
selection we corroborate them in a propensity-score matched subsample (con-
taining 198 observations, see section 4.2 for details) to account for the hetero-
geneity of the merger cases in our sample. The results are reported in figure
2.
Essentially, all the conclusions inferred in the whole sample can be main-
tained in face of the subsample-results. When comparing the differences of the
predictions by the two models to the corresponding time period in figure 1,
we find a similar pattern: average prediction differences of approximately 30%
in the pre-reform period decline to around 20% post-reform. The reduction
in predictive differences before and after ECMR04 is of similar size as in the
whole sample and 5% significant. The coefficient of the time trend regression
(table 3) is considerably larger than in the whole sample (-.16), but drops to
5% significance due to the reduced sample size.
5.4. Robustness checks
This section briefly discusses the results (reported in figure 3) of a number
of robustness checks that were performed on the data.
5.4.1. Horizontal mergers
Dropping all non-horizontal mergers reduces the EU sample to 180 and the
US sample to 190 observations. In spite of this significant reduction in sample
size, all results remain qualitatively unchanged with some reduced significances.
The plot of the differences of model predictions becomes somewhat smoother
but exhibits the same dynamics.
5.4.2. Prohibited and abandoned mergers
About 4% of cases in the EU sample were blocked by DG Competition.
Similarly, 6% of the US sample mergers were abandoned by the parties after
the FTC obtained a preliminary injunction in court. Since these cases were
considered strongly anticompetitive by the respective competition authorities,
they are potential outliers in comparison with the rest of the sample. Even
17
Figure 2: Difference in predictions in matched subsample
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though prohibitions and abortions amount to only 29 observations, dropping
them somewhat improves the convergence results: the time trend coefficient of
the difference in predictions as well as the drop in pre/post reform differences
increase. It thus seems that some heterogeneity remains with respect to the
decision of when to block a merger.
5.4.3. Control for industry dissimilarities
Most of the industry dummies differ substantially among the EU and US
sample. The dummies for the finance and transport & communications indus-
tries have significantly higher means in the EU sample, since in the US these
industries are routinely regulated by the DoJ. Conversely there are more US
observation on mergers in services. Dropping all observations in these indus-
tries reduces the EU sample size to 192 and the US sample size to 214. The
resulting reduction in the differences of the predictions is slightly higher than
in the original sample.
5.4.4. Control for casemix
To control for the possibility that the two agencies systematically investigate
different kinds of cases (i.e. face a different casemix) we employ a nonlinear ver-
sion of the Oaxaca decomposition (Coate and Ulrick, 2009), thereby obtaining
the degree of incoherence that can be attributed to a regime-specific difference.
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Figure 3: Robustness Checks
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5.5.4: Regime differences
From the point of view of both agencies, the absolute regime-specific difference
in jurisdiction diminishes substantially during the sample period.
6. Conclusion
The degree of coherence of globally effective merger policies, such as those
exercised by the EU and the US, is highly relevant from both a consumer welfare
point of view as well as that of the firms notifying a transaction. Since policies
are never perfectly static constructs - merger policy in particular has seen radical
changes in the last decades -, not only the degree of coherence matters, but also
whether the policies converge or diverge. We attempt to address the questions
raised by these observations in an empirical framework.
While merger policy in the US evolved continuously during the sample period
(models restricted to the terms of the Clinton and Bush administrations are not
significantly different from each other), EU merger policy experienced a major
shift induced by the reform of European merger law in 2004. In line with the
theoretical literature on the topic, the empirical models presented here indicate
that the effect of the reform was a step towards greater coherence with US
merger law.
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In particular, we find that the two decision models estimated for the FTC
and the post-ECMR04 Commission do not significantly differ with respect to
their coefficients and that there is a negative and significant time trend, reducing
the difference of the predictions by the two models.
The fact that the decision models cease to significantly differ after 2004 sug-
gests that a very similar set of decision rules is employed by both agencies in
deciding when to intervene. Of course we cannot hope that the set of explana-
tory variables in the models is complete; obviously there are many additional
considerations - some of which are confidential information - which determine
each individual decision. However, with respect to externally observable factors,
the models include a rather comprehensive set of variables, which is reflected in
their goodness-of-fit measures. Given the number and explanatory power of the
variables, the finding that the model coefficients are not significantly different
constitutes powerful evidence in favor of convergence.
When estimating a time trend of prediction errors we find that incongruity
is significantly decreased in the post-reform period. This is confirmed in a
propensity-score matched subsample, yielding qualitatively similar results. Fi-
nally, we run a number of robustness checks to control for vertical and conglom-
erate mergers, prohibited combinations, industry dissimilarities and differences
in the casemix of the two authorities, all of which corroborate the findings in
the main sample.
In summary, the findings of this study indicate that gradual convergence
of jurisdictional patterns occurred after 2004 and lend some empirical support
to the claim, that the 2004 reform of European merger law was indeed a step
towards the US system.
References
Audretsch, D., 1989. Legalized Cartels in West Germany. Antitrust Bulletin
34, 579–600.
Bergman, M., Coate, M., Jakobsson, M., Ulrick, S., 2010a. Comparing merger
policies in the european union and the united states. Review of Industrial
Organization 36, 305–331.
Bergman, M., Coate, M., Jakobsson, M., Ulrick, S., 2010b. Merger Control
in the European Union and the United States: Just the Facts. Available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1565026 (accessed: 25.6.2012) .
Bergman, M., Jakobsson, M., Razo, C., 2005. An econometric analysis of the
european commission’s merger decisions. International Journal of Industrial
Organization 23, 717–737.
Busch, P., Joergens, H., 2005. The international sources of policy convergence:
explaining the spread of environmental policy innovations. Journal of Euro-
pean Public Policy 12, 860–884.
20
Calvani, T., 2004. Conflict, Cooperation, and Convergence in International
Competition. Antitrust Law Journal 72, 1127–46.
Cini, M., McGowan, L., 1998. Competition policy in the European Union.
Palgrave Macmillan.
Coate, M., Ulrick, S., 2006. Transparency at the Federal Trade Commission:
The horizontal merger review process. Antitrust Law Journal 73, 531–570.
Coate, M., Ulrick, S., 2009. Do court decisions drive the federal trade com-
missionŠs enforcement policy on merger settlements? Review of Industrial
Organization 34, 99–114.
Commission, E., 2004. Regulation No 139/2004. Official Journal of the European
Union .
Cooper, J., Froeb, L., O’Brien, D., Vita, M., 2005. A comparative study of
United States and European Union approaches to vertical policy. Geo. Mason
L. Rev. 13, 289–294.
Coppi, L., Walker, M., 2004. Substantial Convergence or Parallel Paths-
Similarities and Differences in the Economic Analysis of Horizontal Mergers
in the US and EU Competition Law. Antitrust Bulletin 49, 101–152.
Drauz, G., Reynolds, M., 2003. EC Merger Control: A Major Reform in
Progress. Richmond Law & Tax London: International Bar Assosiation, Rich-
mond.
Drezner, D., 2001. Globalization and policy convergence. International Studies
Review 3, 53–78.
Duso, T., Gugler, K., Szücs, F., 2010. An Empirical Assessment of the 2004
EU Merger Policy Reform. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=-
1721412 (accessed: 25.6.2012) .
Duso, T., Neven, D., Röller, L., 2007. The Political Economy of European
Merger Control: Evidence using Stock Market Data. The Journal of Law and
Economics 50, 455–489.
FTC, DoJ, 1992. Horizontal Merger Guidelines .
FTC, DoJ, 2010. Horizontal Merger Guidelines .
Haas, P., 1992. Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy
coordination. International Organization , 1–35.
Holzinger, K., Knill, C., 2005. Causes and conditions of cross-national policy
convergence. Journal of European Public Policy 12, 775–796.
Horlick, G., Meyer, M., 1995. International Covergence of Competition Policy,
The, in: International Lawyer, pp. 65–76.
21
Kovacic, W., Shapiro, C., 2000. Antitrust policy: a century of economic and
legal thinking. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, 43–60.
Leary, T., 2002. Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States, The.
Antitrust Law Journal 70, 105–142.
Leuven, E., Sianesi, B., 2003. PSMATCH2: Stata module to perform full Ma-
halanobis and propensity score matching, common support graphing, and
covariate imbalance testing.
Lyons, B., 2004. Reform of European merger policy. Review of International
Economics 12, 246–261.
Mueller, D., 1997. Merger policy in the United States: a reconsideration. Review
of Industrial Organization 12, 655–685.
Niels, G., Ten Kate, A., 2004. Introduction: Antitrust in the US and the EU-
Converging or Diverging Paths. Antitrust Bulletin 49, 1–27.
Patterson, D., Shapiro, C., 2001. Transatlantic divergence in GE/Honeywell :
Causes and lessons. Antitrust Magazine 16, 18–26.
Rosenbaum, P., 1983. The central role of the propensity score in observational
studies for causal effects. Biometrika 70, 41–55.
Scherer, F., 1994. Competition policies for an integrated world economy. Brook-
ings Institution Press.
Scherer, F., 1997. Competition policy convergence: where next? Empirica 24,
5–19.
Schwartz, E., 1993. Politics as Usual: The History of European Community
Merger Control. Yale Journal of International Law 18, 607–662.
Shapiro, C., 2010. The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to
Fox in Forty Years. Antitrust Law Journal 77, 49–109.
Shenefield, J., 2004. Coherence or Confusion: The Future of the Global An-
titrust Conversion. Antitrust Bulletin 49, 385–434.
Van Waarden, F., Drahos, M., 2002. Courts and (epistemic) communities in
the convergence of competition policies. Journal of European Public Policy
9, 913–934.
Verouden, V., Bengtsson, C., Albaek, S., 2004. The Draft EU Notice on Horizon-
tal Mergers: A Further Step Toward Convergence’(2004). Antitrust Bulletin
49, 243–279.
Weichselbaumer, M., 2008. Using Matching to Evaluate Mergers. Available
at: http://www.webmeets.com/files/papers/EARIE/2009/465/weichselbau-
mer.pdf
(accessed: 25.6.2012) .
22
